Electrostatic discharge (ESD) and electrical overstress (EOS) damage of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) has been identified as a new failure mode. This failure mode has not been previously recognized or addressed primarily due to the mechanical nature and functionality ofthese systems, as well as the physical failure signature that resembles stiction. Because many MEMS devices function by electrostatic actuation, the possibility of these devices not only being susceptible to ESD or EOS damage but also having a high probability of suffering catastrophic failure due to ESD or EOS is very real. Results from previous experiments have shown stationary comb fingers adhered to the ground plane on MEMS devices tested in shock, vibration, and benign environments [1, 2] . Using Sandia polysilicon microengines, we have conducted tests to establish and explain the ESD/EOS failure mechanism of MEMS devices. These devices were electronically and optically inspected prior to and after ESD and EOS testing. This paper will address the issues surrounding MEMS susceptibility to ESD and EOS damage as well as describe the experimental method and results found from ESD and EOS testing. The tests were conducted using conventional IC failure analysis and reliability assessment characterization tools. In this paper we will also present a thermal model to accurately depict the heat exchange between an electrostatic comb finger and the ground plane during an ESD event. The purpose of ESD testing using the Machine Model is to simulate an ESD event involving a machine with a lower source resistance than a person (HBM ESD event). Damage to components by a machine ESD event is often similar to the damage due to a human ESD event, but equivalent damage usually occurs at a significantly lower electrostatic voltage on the machine. A MM tester has a discharge network consisting of a charged 200 pF capacitor and (nominally) zero ohms of series resistance [5] . As with HBM testing, the actual series resistance and inductance of the MM tester are specified by defining the current waveform. Because of the nominally zero resistance, the MM waveform for a zero ohm load (shorting wire) is significantly different than the HBM waveform. The voltage waveform produced from a MM ESD event will be much faster than one produced for an HBM ESD event. Figs 
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ESD & EOS Testing Review
It is well known that any electronic device or assembly will experience damage at some energy level. Short duration, high voltage transient events are common, including lightning, electromagnetic pulses, and human electrostatic discharges. ESD in manufacturing is generally considered to involve a lower level of energy compared to the energy of events such as lightning (an extreme example of ESD) or the misconnection of a device to a low impedance power supply (a common cause of EOS).
Therefore, ESD in manufacturing is commonly considered a subset of the wide range of possible EOS events that can damage devices and assemblies.
Some level of electrostatically-generated charge exists in any manufacturing environment. Voltages produced electrostatically can reach magnitudes that will easily destroy semiconductor devices and even damage passive components, such as resistors, in environments that are dry and have no ESD avoidance procedures. Preventing ESD damage to components involves two approaches: (1) control of the manufacturing environment to suppress electrostatic charge generation and damaging discharge events and (2) modification ofthe component design to increase the ability to withstand an ESD event. The first approach involves implementing proper ESD handling and work environment procedures such as avoiding the use of charge generating materials, the use of grounded wristbands, anti-static smocks, and air ionizers. The second approach involves modifying components to include protection diodes or other ESD protection circuitry to increase the circuit or MEMSstructure ESD damage threshold [3] .
To evaluate the ability of a component to withstand an ESD event, it is common to use ESD testing that attempts to simulate a specific type of transient event. ESD events are complex because they are the result of many controlling factors that vary greatly (parasitic capacitances and inductances, types of materials, how these materials contact each other, etc.). Therefore, the ability to adequately replicate a specific ESD situation can be quite difficult. For all of the simulation methods, controlling the impedances and parasitics of the test environment are critical, due to the large high frequency components in the transient event.
Without proper tester design and interconnection to the device being tested, waveform degradation due to inherently mismatched source/termination impedances can cause severe ringing, reflection pulses, and other high frequency effects.
The oldest and most common ESD simulation model is based on measurements of human body discharge voltage waveforms. The discharge waveforms for a number of individuals charged to high voltages have been evaluated, as were their capacitances and resistances in various physical positions with respect to their surroundings. Evaluation of the average parameters resulted in the Human Body Model (HBM): a capacitance of 100 pF with a series resistance of 1500 ohms and a decay time constant of 150 ns [4] . HBM testers will typically have the ability to charge the 100 pF capacitor up to several thousand volts and an appropriately controlled relay to provide single or repeated discharges through the 1500 ohm resistor to the device being tested. The purpose of ESD testing using the Machine Model is to simulate an ESD event involving a machine with a lower source resistance than a person (HBM ESD event). Damage to components by a machine ESD event is often similar to the damage due to a human ESD event, but equivalent damage usually occurs at a significantly lower electrostatic voltage on the machine. A MM tester has a discharge network consisting of a charged 200 pF capacitor and (nominally) zero ohms of series resistance [5] . As with HBM testing, the actual series resistance and inductance of the MM tester are specified by defining the current Table 2 . HBM current waveform through a shorting wire (td) [4] . . MM current waveform through a 500 resistor for a 400 volt discharge [5] .
device and thus the discharge event is faster with correspondingly higher frequency components, the ability to properly simulate this type of event is much more difficult. Standard methods for CDM testing are under development and will be published this year [8] . Charged device damage is more difficult to avoid using device design modifications because the path for charge transfer may not involve the input/output pin circuitry in the same maimer as HBM or MM ESD events. The type of damage caused by CDM ESD may be different than the damage produced by HBM or MM ESD. The charge and discharge of a device (or part of a device) that is structurally isolated can possibly cause electrical damage resulting in failure of that component.
BACKGROUND It has been known for many years that ESD can damage
ICs and other semiconductor and electrical devices [9] . This is evident by the extensive development and use of ESD handling procedures and protective circuitry.
However, electrostatic and electrical overstress damage in MEMS has not been investigated due to the relative infancy of the field. One model that predicts the breakdown voltage for sub-millimeter gap spacings is Paschen's Law [10] . The "Paschen curve" represents the breakdown voltage between two conductors (Vs) plotted vs the product of the distance between them (d) and the surrounding gas pressure (P. typically ambient atmosphere) V =f(Pd) [10] . In the case of electrostatic actuators and other MEMS devices, the small gap spacings "should" prevent a Paschen effect on voltage breakdown due to a lack of ionizing collisions to induce avalanche over a short distance [10] . Experimental Approach ESD ESD tests were performed using an IMCS Model 2500 ESD tester. This tester was modified for improved HBM waveform characteristics [13, 14, 15, 16] with an HBM module (100 pf capacitance). Calibration was performed by a qualified service company [1 7] as required by the most recent HBM test standard [4] to assure that the waveform met the latest specification requirements and that valid ESD stress data were obtained. The HBM waveform required by this test standard is similar to that of MIL-STD-883D Method 3015.7, but the characteristic and ESD stress test methods are refined to assure optimal HBM ESD event simulation fidelity.
The calibration current pulse requirements were shown in Figs. 1 and 2 and Tables 1 and  2 . The intent is to create a voltage pulse at the device being tested that has a relatively fast rise time (2 to 5 ns) and slow decay (1 50 ns). This is sometimes referred to as a double exponential waveform. The IMCS ESD tester and a Selected actuators were structurally characterized using the scanning electron microscope (SEM) to evaluate the integrity of the comb fingers. This analysis was conducted to determine if contamination or other structural defects were present along the comb fingers prior to the experiment. SEM inspection did not reveal damaged comb fingers, contamination, structural defects, or comb fingers contacting other regions of the microengine. The results from this analysis were compared to the results obtained from the same drive combs after ESD testing to assess for damage or structural degradation. Eleven microengines were tested and 10 were operational, permitting 20 actuators (a sample size of 40 drive signals) for ESD testing.
HBM ESD testing was initiated using a single 100 V pulse. After the 100 V pulse, the voltage was increased in 10 V increments. The drive signal was electrically characterized after each pulse to verify functionality or identify failure. The drive signal was deemed passing if no shorting events were detected. Prior to each pulse, the drive signal was grounded to remove any residual charge along the comb fingers.
RestoringSprings
If a drive signal on an actuator was diagnosed as electrically shorted, SEM analysis was used to structurally characterize the actuator. SEM analysis on two-level polysilicon actuators can be difficult due to the complexity of the device, the change in height from the top comb finger to the ground plane, and masking of certain regions by the moveable shuttle. As illustrated in Fig. 7a , the tips of the comb fingers can be analyzed by tilting the device in the SEM. If a shorting event were to occur along the sides of the fixed comb fingers, the moveable shuttle would prohibit characterization (as shown in Fig. 7b ).
To aid in analyzing shorted comb fingers, a focused ion beam (FIB) system was employed to excise the moveable shuttle. FIB cuts were performed around the anchored sections of the movable shuttle. Nine FIB cuts were performed, 4 along each anchor (2 anchors) and one along the linkage arm connecting the shuttle to the gear. After the FIB cuts were performed, the movable shuttle was extracted using a probe tip covered with double-stick carbon tape. consuming. After electrical testing was used to determine which drive signal was shorted, the SEM was employed to localize the comb finger causing the short. After localizing the shorted comb finger, SEM analysis revealed significant damage along the ground plane and tips of the comb fingers as illustrated in Figs In every instance, the shorted comb finger has damage somewhere along the edge of the finger and the ground plane. Since the fingertips are regions where the electric fields are at their highest, it is not surprising that this is the failure site. This physical signature has also been observed on microengines coated with a thin tungsten film [17a], although the damage found on tungsten coated actuators is far more severe than that found on polysilicon actuators.
To identify the power needed to cause polysilicon to melt, thermal modeling was performed to simulate a discharge event between asperities on a comb finger and ground plane [19] . The initial model was closely based on data obtained from an atomic force microscope (AFM).
image reveals small "nodules" along the surface ofthe comb finger. The AFM results reveal an RMS surface roughness on the top surface of' 7.84 nm.
If one assumes the bottom portion of the comb finger has a similar surface roughness, a thermal model based on an electrical discharge event occurring between comb finger and ground plane asperities can be established. Prior work performed on similar structures indicates that this is a reasonable assumption. The thermal model illustrated in Fig. 13 simulates the temperature in the asperity areas. The temperature excursion along the asperity peaks is well beyond the melting temperature of polysilicon (1410 °C) [20] . The peak temperature modeled given a 1.35 W event is over 10,000 °C. The power was calculated based upon 10% of a 150V ESD event with a current of 0.09 amp. (13.5 W) passing through a comb finger. Although, this excursion is modeled for a 10 ns discharge event (corresponding to the current peak of an HBM ESD pulse), the temperature is well above the melting temperature for polysilicon.
The electrical discharge may cause more than one comb finger to "weld" to the ground plane. Figs. 14a , b, and c show a failed comb drive from an ESD event. A comb finger is shown contacting the ground plane (Fig. 14b) and another comb finger appears to have contacted the ground plane, but the restoring force in the comb finger caused the comb finger to pop back up (Fig. 14c ). It has also been shown that electrostatic comb fingers can recover from an ESD or EOS event.
AFM revealed the surface topography and surface The results of ESD testing show that the mean voltage required to produce failure using the HBM testing is -153 V. As shown in Fig. 15 , the voltage range found to produce failure of these drive signals ranged from 130 V to 180 V. In every instance, a shorted comb finger occurred along the tested comb drive. In some instances, more than one comb finger was shorted to the ground plane but, in every instance, damage occurred along the ground plane and comb finger.
Using the electrostatic model of Osterberg et. al., [21] we can calculate the collapse voltage (Va) required to bring the tip of the comb finger down to the ground plane. The
where g0 is the gap between the finger and the ground plane and e is the permittivity of the gap material. 
CONCLUSIONS
As shown in polysilicon micromachines, MEMS devices are very susceptible to electrical overstress and electrostatic discharge damage.
The reasons may be attributed to enhanced electric field effects surrounding corners of the comb finger(s), asperities producing strong localized electric fields, and the flexiblity of the structures. An electrical short caused by an ESD or EOS event has been shown to "spot weld" a comb finger to the ground plane. The damage found along polysilicon comb fingers appears to be "welding" to the ground plane. New methods are being developed to characterize ESD/EOS and other electrical shorting failure modes quickly and accurately [23J.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests MEMS devices are very susceptible to ESD and EOS events at relatively low voltages. This data does not agree with Paschen's Law at small gap spacings, but supports data provided by Torres et. al. [12] . This may be due to the flexibility of 48 jim long 2 jim thick polysilicon comb fingers. The mechanism by which the comb fingers fail is not clear. Either the comb finger bends down, contacting
FUTURE WORK
Further studies testing newly developed MEMS devices for electrical breakdown are pertinent to the growth of MEMS in both government and industrial applications.
Addressing the effects of the various ESD models (machine model and charged device model), as well as the effects of cumulative damage will be extremely beneficial towards understanding the effects of an entire system on a device during operation, and the effect of multiple electrical events on the device. Implementing protective measures and examining their effectiveness in improving reliability will also be addressed. 
